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While the term “corporate governance” is now used universally when managerial accountability in publicly traded
companies is under consideration, the term was largely unknown until the 1970s. In a recent paper, I explain how
and why corporate governance moved to the forefront in the manner it did in the United States, the country where
the term first came to prominence.
Managerial revolution
The United States experienced in the late 19 th and early 20th centuries a “managerial revolution,” where a growing
division between ownership and control was accompanied by the promulgation of increasingly sophisticated
managerial hierarchies. The trend climaxed with an era of “managerial capitalism” running from the end of the World
War II to the 1970s. During this era corporate scandals were rare amidst sustained economic prosperity. The dearth
of corporate wrongdoing cannot be attributed to present-day mainstays of theoretically sound corporate governance,
namely vigilant boards and attentive stockholders . Boards deferred to management absent a crisis and, with
retail investors collectively owning a majority of outstanding shares, the prospects for meaningful shareholder
engagement were bleak.
Various factors kept public company executives on the straight and narrow during the managerial capitalism era
despite deferent boards and passive shareholders. In key economic sectors, industry-level regulation curtailed
executive discretion. With the U.S. experiencing an era of “boring” banking due to tight regulation, restricted
access to finance helped to keep managerial ambition in check. Finally, unions were powerful and to avoid
debilitating strikes executives accepted numerous changes to work rules that limited their managerial prerogatives.
Strong corporate governance as a reaction to mismanagement in the 1970’s
In the 1970s, with U.S. public companies under growing pressure due to foreign competition and challenging
macroeconomic conditions, evidence of mismanagement and corporate malfeasance proliferated. This set the
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scene for greater emphasis on the governance mechanisms largely ignored during the heyday of managerial
capitalism. Throughout the 1970s boards were reconfigured to considerably bolster the role of independent directors
as managerial monitors. The balance of power between management and stockholders in public companies also
began to shift in the stockholders’ favour. A wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s meant the fate of publicly traded
companies hinged to an unprecedented degree on shareholder perceptions of the capabilities of the incumbent
management team. Also, institutional investors, which had replaced retail investors as the dominant owners of
shares, successfully lobbied companies to reconfigure executive pay to ensure top management would be rewarded
generously if shareholder returns were robust.
Dramatic changes affecting the discretion available to executives of U.S. public companies enhanced still further the
profile of corporate governance as the 20th century drew to a close. With commercial and investment banks —
formerly conservative allocators of capital — competing intensely for business, executives of public companies had
unprecedented scope to finance new acquisitions and ambitious expansion plans. A marked decline in union power
and a wave of deregulation likewise increased the latitude executives had available to them. In this new
environment, executive performance likely mattered more for corporate success than it had during the managerial
capitalism era. The proper functioning of corporate governance logically became a higher priority.
Corporate governance had very much “arrived” by the 1990s. Nevertheless, corporate scandals that engulfed
prominent U.S. corporations in the early 2000s demonstrated the arrangements in place were not sufficiently robust
to cope appropriately with the imperial-style chief executive who had moved to the forefront as managerial
discretion expanded. Matters changed quickly. Due to a combination of regulatory reforms prompted by the scandals
and a dramatic surge in activism by hedge funds lobbying aggressively for the unlocking of shareholder value, chief
executives would soon be more embattled than imperial.
Banks were a temporary exception. Due to strong financial results, top executives of freewheeling financial firms
enjoyed something of a corporate governance “free pass” for much of the 2000s. The 2008 financial crisis ended
any special treatment. The regulatory and governance changes which ensued restored at least some of the
boringness that had been a hallmark of banks of the managerial capitalism era.
Post managerial capitalism
While in the U.S. the managerial capitalism era ended in the 1970s, a consensus has yet to emerge on what to call
what has replaced it, with contenders including “fiduciary capitalism,” “investor capitalism,” and “shareholder
capitalism”. Regardless of what label ultimately moves to the forefront, corporate governance has emerged as a
significant feature of this new era. There is mixed evidence concerning the impact of theoretically sound corporate
governance on corporate performance. Regardless, today’s public company executives are clearly facing a
considerably different menu list of opportunities and constraints than their managerial capitalism era counterparts
and the growing prominence of corporate governance has contributed substantially to that process.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This post is based on the author’s paper Corporate Governance since the Managerial Capitalism Era,
in Business History Review / Volume 89 / Issue 04 / Winter 2015, pp 717-744
The post gives the views of its author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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